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1. Summary 
 Since privatisation the water companies have continued to increase investment, in line with the 
growth which began in the 1980s under the publicly owned RWAs.  
 The level of this investment has been driven by standards legally required by the EU and the UK 
government, and part financed by government subsidy 
 The shareholders of the private companies have financed almost none of this investment, instead the 
companies have borrowed and built up their debts 
 Debt finance is cheaper than shareholder equity, but government debt is cheapest of all 
 Productivity has been growing more slowly since privatisation 
 Outsourcing has threatened the quality of labour, and the regulator has played no part in developing 
industry training standards 
 The companies have almost ceased to invest in research and development 
 Prices have risen sharply in real terms, despite the cut in 1999 
 There is a growing problem of water poverty in the UK 
 Regulation provides little scope for disclosure of information or public participation 
 The regulator has been deceived by the companies legally, by overestimating capital investments, 
and illegally, by miscalculating key figures on customer debt, customer service, and leakage 
 The regulator has given companies almost eternal monopolies by requiring 25 years notice of 
termination  
 The droughts and water shortages have been highly predictable, the companies have failed to reduce 
leakage, and leakage is at levels of east European and Asian cities 
 There is no coherent forum for policy-making on water at national or regional level 
 There remains a substantial majority in favour of public ownership of water, and always has been 
 The water sector could be brought into public ownership under the current regional structure, with 
new boards including representatives from government and local government 
 Public ownership would replace private capital with cheaper public finance, and could lead to 
savings of £900million per year. 
 
2. Introduction 
Until 1974, water services in England and Wales were run by local authorities, as they still are in nearly all 
other countries.  In 1974 the regional water authorities (RWAs) were created, each covering a river basin 
area, under the effective control of central government. In 1989 the Thatcher government privatised these 
regional companies by selling their shares on the stock exchange. In Scotland and Northern Ireland water 
remains controlled and operated by public authorities.  
 
This privatisation of the water companies was supposed to improve the economics and governance of the 
water industry, by comparison with public ownership. The economic benefits were expected to be: 
 
 Higher levels of investment 
 Investment financed by private shareholders, which would be better value than using public finance 
 Greater efficiency from private sector management than from public sector managers 
 
The governance benefits were supposed to be: 
 A regulator who would protect consumers from over-charging 
 An independent, non-political, regulator could provide a better long-term perspective than politicians 
 The public would prefer a privatised water service to the public sector 
  
This report reviews the evidence on these issues. 
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3. Investment 
 
One of the key reasons for privatisation was to improve the level of investment. It was expected that this 
would be financed by private investors, who would be induced into investing their money because they could 
see the opportunity for good returns as a result of the regulatory mechanisms. This would be more efficient 
for the national economy than using public finance for investment.  
3.1. Levels of investment 
The level of actual capital investment in the water industry has been much higher since 1989 than it was in 
the previous decade. This is now claimed as an indicator of the success of privatisation: a factsheet published 
by OFWAT gives the figures for investment before and after 1989, and claims: ―Under Ofwat, investment in 
water and sewerage services is at its highest ever level‖.1  According to OFWAT, a total of £55 billion has 
been invested in the 15 years since privatisation, an average of £3.7 billion per year, compared with an 
average figure of £2 billion per year during the 1980s. 2  This is a difference of £1.7 billion per year, or 46% 
of all expenditure. (All figures are at 2004-2005 prices).  
 
This picture however exaggerates the difference between investment levels before and after 1989. The 
RWAs did not make the same level of investment throughout the 1980s, but showed a clearly rising trend 
towards the end of the decade, recovering from the long decline in investment imposed by successive 
governments between 1975 and 1985 (see annex). Between 1985 and 1989 investment rose steadily from 
about £1.6 billion to over £2.2 billion per year, so their investment had been increasing at a rate of 8% per 
year in the second half of the 1980s. The OFWAT comparison assumes that there would have been no 
further increase by the RWAs, but this is very implausible: because of the legal requirements for investment 
(see next section) the RWAs would certainly have had to continue increasing their level of investment. Even 
if this increase had averaged 4% per annum, half the rate they were delivering in the second half of the 
1980s, they would have delivered a total investment of over £50 billion over the next 15 years: about the 
same as the private companies have actually achieved.  
 
Table 1 Investment levels and growth rates before and after privatisation  
(£billion, 2003-04 prices) 
 1985 1989 2004 Average annual % 
growth rate 
RWAs (pre-privatisation) 1.6 2.2 - 8% 
     
Privatised companies and OFWAT - 2.2 3.6 3% 
Source: OFWAT 3, author‘s calculations 
 
An examination of the factors behind the need for investment, and the financing mechanisms used, also 
suggest that the credit for the improvement should not lie with the act of privatisation, nor the activity of 
OFWAT.  
3.2. Drivers of investment: EU legislation 
The biggest factor driving this increase in expenditure was but the EU directives on higher standards for the 
quality of drinking water, cleanliness of beaches, and in particular treatment of wastewater. There are various 
estimates of the scale of this. In 1993 the government claimed that the water companies were investing £3 
billion per year to achieve the standards required in the directives4 - this was clearly an exaggeration, as that 
would represent over 100% of the actual capital expenditure in that year.  In 2004, OFWAT estimated that 
about 50% of all capital expenditure– equivalent to £1.9 billion per year, more than the whole increase in 
spending – is required in order to meet new quality standards, 5 which largely stem from the EU directives. 
This is consistent with OFWAT‘s estimate in 1992, that the implementation of EU directives would cost £10 
billion (adjusted to current prices) 6. An EC report in 2000 estimated that the EU wastewater directive alone 
has required investment in the UK averaging £0.6 billion per year since 1990. 7 It seems reasonable to 
conclude that at least half of all the increase in capital investment since privatisation is entirely attributable to 
PSIRU University of Greenwich                                                                                                                        www.psiru.org 
09/07/2010  Page 5 of 45  
  
the requirements of the EU directives. The UK was legally obliged to carry out this investment, whether 
privatisation happened or not.   
 
The privatisation process, in itself, simply created new sources of resistance to these improvements. Whereas 
in the 1980s the government had sought to avoid paying for the improvements required by the EU, from 
privatisation onwards both the companies and OFWAT tried to avoid making such investments. During the 
passage of the law, the government tried to insert a clause to exempt the privatised water companies from 
prosecution by the European Commission (EC) for failure to comply with the directives: 
―The latter point is of crucial importance to City analysts, with growing doubts about the value of 
buying into a privatised water industry for which ministers are promising a tough regulatory regime 
on prices and higher environmental standards requiring heavy investment. Ministers have been 
seeking to allow privatised water companies to delay implementation of tough EEC directives on 
drinking water standards.‖ 8 
This attempt failed: the EC warned the government that it had no power to waive EU laws in this way9. The  
opposition to the requirements of the directives nevertheless continued after privatisation, with OFWAT 
itself challenging the need for the investment in 1992, 1993 and later.10  
 
3.3. Public finance for private investment 
It is also true that, after privatisation, the finance became available to pay for the necessary investment. This 
however was partly due to the government injecting a large amount of money, by writing off all the debts of 
the water companies before privatisation, plus a further ―green dowry‖ to meet the environmental standards 
required by the EU. In addition to this cash injection, the government allowed the private companies to make 
large real increases in the price of water, which the RWAs had been prevented from doing, and the private 
companies were freed from the limits on public sector borrowing.  
 
The final value of the debt write-off was worth over £5 billion, and the green dowry £1.5 billion – roughly 
equivalent to the total received for the sale of the companies (the water and sewerage companies even gained 
an extra £120million just by having these gifts in the bank in 1990/91).
11
 These public subsidies alone 
financed roughly one-third of all the investments in the first 10 years of privatisation.
12 There was a 
further subsidy, in the form of tax relief on the companies‘ profits, worth £7.7 billion13  The total amount of 
public finance injected into the privatised water companies was thus over £14 billion (though much of the tax 
relief was subsequently clawed back by the ‗windfall tax‘ introduced by the new Labour government in 
1997).   
 
All of these things could have done without privatisation, as a Financial Times editorial pointed out, in 1989, 
under the heading ―Private Water, Public Costs‖:  
―One of the Thatcher Government's odder justifications for privatising the water services is that the 
state would never have found enough money to clean up the industry to meet the state's own 
standards. However, Mr Michael Howard, the minister in charge of the sale, yesterday announced 
steep price rises stretching to the end of the 1990s and a large injection of government money. This 
will help pay for improvements in the purity of drinking water and the removal of untreated sewage 
from rivers as required by the Water Act 1989. These expenditures are necessary, but it is not 
obvious why privatisation was necessary to achieve them. The Government has now been obliged to 
put £5.4 billion up front to grease the slipway to flotation, writing off the industry's debts to the 
Treasury and adding a cash bonus imaginatively decked out as a "green dowry."‖ 14 
3.4. Shift from equity to debt 
When the companies were privatised, they were expected to finance investment like other private companies 
– by shareholders investing in the company (‗equity‘), supplemented by the company increasing its debts by 
issuing bonds or bank loans. The water companies had almost no debt when they were privatised in 1989 – 
the government had written off all the existing debts – by contrast, companies in general in the UK have 
debts representing between 20 and 30 per cent of the total of debt and equity (the ‗gearing‘ ratio).15  The 
broad expectation was that as the water companies made profits, investors would continue to inject money, 
and the price limits have been set in order to create this incentive: ―OFWAT’s aim at each price review has 
been to ensure that returns assumed should provide shareholders with sufficient incentives to provide 
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additional funds, either in the form of retained earnings or new equity, to enable companies to make new 
investment where this is appropriate.” 16 
 
But in practice, there has been a sharp and steady increase in debts, and an actual reduction in shareholder 
equity. The gearing of the water companies has risen from an average of 0% to an average of 60%, with a 
number of companies having gearings over 75%.  Instead of shareholders putting money into the industry, 
there has been a significant withdrawal of shareholder equity from the water companies  – the exact opposite 
of the effect desired from OFWAT‘s regulation.  It represents a return to the same form of finance used by 
public sector water operators – indeed, a significant part of the borrowing has been from the European 
Investment Bank (EIB), a public sector bank owned by the European Union which is able to lend at very 
good rates.  There has been only one case in the 17 years since privatisation, of a water company raising new 
funds from shareholders, when United Utilities raised £1 billion from rights issues in 2003 and 2005. But 
only £100 million of this has been invested in the water industry as direct shareholder equity investment –
another £200 million has been invested in the form of a loan from the parent group to the water company. 1718 
 
This happened in two phases. Firstly, during the decade following privatisation, the companies paid out a lot 
of dividends to their shareholders with a return on capital reaching 12%. Interest rates were however far 
lower than this, and so the companies preferred to borrow to finance investment, and used the profits from 
higher prices to pay dividends to their shareholders.  
 
The second phase followed the price review of 1999. Following the 1997 general election, the new Labour 
government introduced first a windfall tax on utility company profits, and then OFWAT set price caps which 
required 12% cuts in prices. The combined result was to squeeze the profitability of the industry. The rate of 
return on capital was halved, from 12% to 6%. The response of many companies to this was to withdraw 
equity capital as far as possible, and instead use debt to finance the great majority of operations. 
 
Different methods of withdrawing equity were adopted. The most extreme version took place in Wales, 
where the private water and energy utility was taken over by a consortium of USA energy companies, who 
wanted to abandon the water business altogether. They transferred all the assets, liabilities and statutory 
functions to a not-for-profit company, run by an appointed and self-perpetuating group of individuals, and 
financed entirely by debt. (This entity is neither elected by citizens nor owned by shareholders or customers, 
but is often wrongly described as a cooperative or a mutual). Another company proposed complete 
withdrawal of equity from Yorkshire Water, by selling the company to a consumer cooperative, but this was 
abandoned as a result of fierce local opposition.  
 
Other companies have simply reduced their equity stakes and replaced them with debts, including Anglian 
and Southern water. The water only companies have undergone a number of similar restructurings: for 
example East Surrey issued a £100m bond; Mid Kent Water was purchased by a management  buyout, the 
Swan Group, funded predominantly by debt from WestLB19; there was a similar deal at Portsmouth Water, 
backed originally by Royal Bank of Scotland; Veolia‘s former shareholdings in Bristol Water and South 
Staffordshire were purchased by an investment fund, Ecofin Water and Power. 20  
 
The objective in these proposals has been for the shareholders to sell their investment and maximise the price 
they get for it. This was most apparent in the proposal to sell Yorkshire Water to its customers in 2000 
(subsequently disallowed by OFWAT), which would have delivered up to £1 billion to the shareholders, 
more than twice what they had paid for the company in 1989, in addition to the £350m which had been 
received in dividends already. 21  The Financial Times commented on this proposal that: "From the 
shareholders' point of view, spinning the water and waste assets into a mutual, financed entirely by debt, is 
all gravy”.22  One analyst commented that: “The turn to mutualisation, far from representing a return to a 
form of public ownership, represents an exit strategy for the infrastructure industries and a mechanism for 
evading price regulation, at the expense of consumers. We can expect more subtle variants on the mutual 
theme to surface in the future. That this should happen within 11 years of privatisation is testimony to the 
failure of the policy” 23 
 
As a result, the gearing of the companies – the proportion financed by debt rather than equity – has risen 
from nearly zero at privatisation to over 61% in 2005. 24 
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3.5. The cost of capital 
The effect of this change has been to highlight how expensive it is to finance investment using shareholders‘ 
equity. As OFWAT has acknowledged: ―debt financing has, other things being equal, been a significantly 
cheaper source of finance than equity since privatisation‖.25    
 
Indeed, OFWAT pointed this out very soon after privatisation, in a 1991 paper which estimated that the cost 
of equity for the water companies was about 5%-7%, the cost of company bonds about 3% to 5%, and the 
cost of government bonds about 2%-4%. 26 A detailed study of long-term rates of return over the whole 
the 20th century, commissioned by OFWAT in 2003,  concluded with similar figures: that the long-term 
average cost of equity is around 5.5%-7.5%, whereas the ‗risk-free‘ rate (typically of government 
bonds) is about 2.5%.27  OFWAT also noted that the actual cost of long-term government bonds since 
World War 1 has been less than 1% 28, which is also the effective cost of long-term index-linked bonds 
observed at the start of 2006. 29 The figures used in these papers for government debt are broadly in line 
with other estimates.30 
 
The central numbers in these estimates are shown in the graph. Simplifying, they mean that if a private 
company replaces equity with debt, the cost of capital falls by roughly a third. If a company has an equal 
mixture of debt and equity – 50% gearing – then its average cost of capital is 5%, and moving from here 
to 100% debt would reduce the cost of capital by a fifth.   
 
Moving to ‗risk-free‘ government debt would reduce it still further (and if the actual rate of long-term 
government bonds is achieved, the cost of using capital is one-sixth of the cost of using equity). As the 
IMF recently observed: “private sector borrowing generally costs more than government borrowing..”131 
Because the water industry is very capital intensive, the potential savings are very significant.  
 
Chart A. Cost of capital estimated by OFWAT and others 
 
Cost of capital: equity, debt, and government (% rate of return)
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Source: OFWAT, Helm 2006. 32 
 
 
                                                     
1  IMF PPPs, para 22 
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OFWAT and other regulators have however been very concerned that this drift to cheaper debt 
undermines the basic concept behind privatisation, that private shareholders can drive efficiency 
improvements. A 2004 report on whether the structure of the industry was still ‗fit for purpose‘ 
concluded reassuringly that it was. 33 In 2006, a paper by economist Dieter Helm34 was followed by a 
joint paper from OFWAT and OFGEM [the regulator for gas and electricity] on ‗Financing Network 
Services‘35 .  Helm discusses four different models of finance (including ―private equity in partnership 
with direct pension fund investment‖), but – like all the other papers -  ignores the possibility of public 
ownership. Yet elsewhere in the same paper Helm himself points out that: ―The alternative—and the 
overwhelmingly dominant one in recent history—is state ownership and guarantees. Roads, and now 
much of rail, remain in that category in Britain, and across Europe, nuclear electricity in France and 
municipal water are in this category too.‖ 
 
4. Efficiency and productivity 
One of the major expectations of privatisation was that it would improve the efficiency of the water industry. 
Private ownership was expected to bring stricter cost management, driven by the incentive to increase profit 
margins, and so the productivity of the companies would improve, enabling consumers to benefit from lower 
prices as well the companies benefiting from higher profits. OFWAT‘s system of regulation is also designed 
to create incentives for the companies to increase their profits by making efficiency savings. The expectation 
would therefore be that the operating costs of the industry should be reduced. 
 
4.1. Productivity before and after privatisation 
The data on operating expenditure does not however show any significant reduction in the 15 years since 
privatisation. After adjusting for inflation, the operating expenditure reported by OFWAT increased in the 
early 1990s, before falling back to the same level as the year after privatisation.  
 
Table 2 Operating expenditure of water companies 1990-91 to 2004-05 
 1990-91 1994-95 1998-99 2004-05 
£m. 2004-05 prices 2946 3219 2955 2937 
Index 1990-91=100 100 109 100 100 
Source: OFWAT reports on financial performance, PSIRU calculations. 36 
 
However, changes in operating expenditure reflect not only productivity changes but also outputs, and so a 
level performance in terms of operating expenditure still reflects a growth in productivity. For example, the 
EU directives on quality require not only increased capital expenditure but also higher maintenance costs: an 
EC study estimated that the wastewater directive alone requires an extra £290million per year in operating 
expenditure by 2010. 37 The overall productivity of the water companies has certainly increased since 
privatisation, but there remains the question what has been the impact of privatisation and regulation on 
productivity. 
 
The empirical evidence indicates that there has not been any significant improvement in productivity 
performance since privatisation.  A study analysed the growth in productivity in the five years before 
privatisation, and the 10 years after privatisation, and concluded that: ―despite reductions in labour usage, 
total factor productivity growth has not improved since privatisation.‖ 38  A further study using a different 
method showed that total factor productivity may have improved after 1995 but ―neither paper finds any 
evidence of an increase in TFP growth that can be directly attributed to privatisation‖39.  Since 1999 the 
performance appears to have got worse. A paper commissioned by OFWAT in 2004 found a decline in 
productivity growth rates after 2001. This study focussed on operating expenditure, but it also found that for 
the water only companies ―capital efficiency appears to be declining … particularly after the 1999 price 
review‖. 40 A further study, published in 2007, with a further change in methodology, confirmed the broad 
picture, and concluded that: ―while technical change improved after privatization, productivity growth did 
not improve …. average efficiency levels were actually moderately lower in 2000 than they had been at 
privatization.‖ 41  
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So the private companies cut jobs more rapidly than was happening in the 5 years before privatisation, but,  
although labour productivity has risen slightly faster, when other factors are taken into account, including 
capital, the total factor productivity of the companies has grown less rapidly since privatisation than it was 
doing in the five years before privatisation.42 
 
 
The table summarises this evidence.  
Table 3 Growth of productivity before and after privatisation. 
 Before 
privatisation After privatisation 
 
 1985-1990 1990-1999 2000 -2003 
 Average annual 
% change 
Average annual 
% change 
Average annual 
% change 
Growth in outputs 2.7 2.6  
Change in employment -1.9 -2.8  
Labour productivity 4.5 5.4  
Total factor productivity 2.3 1.6  
Opex productivity (water & sewer cos)  1.9* 1.8 
Opex productivity (water only cos)  1.3* 1.2 
Source: Saal and Parker 2001. 43; Stone and Webster 2004 44 and author‘s calculations 
*Opex productivity average for period 1993-1999 
 
The studies also found that the companies had been increasing their prices faster than their increases in costs, 
which suggests that the regulatory regime of OFWAT has failed to fix prices to reflect efficiency gains: 
―Moreover, total price performance indices reveal that increases in output prices have outstripped increases 
in input costs, a trend which is largely responsible for the increase in economic profits which has occurred 
since privatisation.‖ 45  
 
4.2. Public ownership and efficiency 
While these results may seem surprising, they are consistent with other findings that privatisation is not 
connected to greater efficiency.46 The IMF observed in 2004 that in relation to the supposed efficiency of the 
private sector ―the theory is ambiguous and the empirical evidence is mixed” 47.  A World Bank paper in 
2005, reviewing studies on the water industry, worldwide, concluded that “there is no statistically significant 
difference between the efficiency performance of public and private operators in this sector”. 48   
 
Studies of the UK privatisations in general have concluded that there is “little evidence that privatisation has 
caused a significant improvement in performance. Generally the great expectations for privatisation evident 
in ministerial speeches have not been borne out"49, and were “unable to find .. evidence that output, labour, 
capital and TFP productivity in the UK increased substantially as a consequence of ownership change at 
privatisation compared to the long-term trend.” 50  
 
The historical evidence on the UK water industry, the actual experience under privatisation in England and 
Wales, and global experience all indicate that the industry would be at least as efficient under public 
ownership.   
 
4.3. Employment, outsourcing and training 
The private companies have steadily reduced employment in the industry. As the previous table shows, they 
have reduced the numbers employed at a faster rate than was being done before privatisation.  
Many of the private water companies have replaced direct labour by outsourcing work to contractors. 
Between 1994-95 and 1998-99 there were 22% cuts in labour costs, around £90 million, but nearly half of 
this was offset by a rise of £40million in the cost of agencies and contractors services.51  Over the next five 
years, to 2004-05, labour costs were cut by a further £16 million (4%), but with a £9 million increase in 
agencies and contractors, as companies have contracted out functions that were previously carried out by 
their own employees. 52  
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Outsourcing in particular is known to have a significant negative effect on the level of training, as sub-
contractors seek to reduce overheads in order to submit tenders lower than competitors. In 2005 there were 
signs that OFWAT had begun to recognise that outsourcing could have negative implications for the quality 
of labour in the industry, and so on the industry‘s performance. It warned the new owners of the Surry and 
East Sutton water that if they outsourced an increased amount of work in the future ―we might require further 
licence modifications… to ensure that the regulated business retained control of its outsourced functions, to 
enable it to meet its responsibilities as a water undertaker.‖ 53 Otherwise OFWAT has paid almost no 
attention to employment policies in the sector.  
 
The training standards of the industry have nevertheless been maintained through the Sector Skills Council 
for electricity, gas, waste management and water (EUskills). This has two distinctive features; firstly it is a 
government-funded organisation, and secondly it involves joint working arrangements between the 
employers and trade union in the industry. EUskills has identified future skill needs for the industry, 
developed new National Occupation Standards for revised NVQs, and developed Apprenticeship and 
Foundation Degree frameworks, and a transferable training ‗passport‘ scheme. 54 
                   .      
4.4. Low R & D expenditure 
The private water companies are now spending about the same on research and development (R&D) as 
before privatisation. R&D can develop new technologies that provide more efficient or effective systems -  a 
computerised control system that was developed by Yorkshire Water  saved £5m per year in energy 
costs as well as assisting long-term planning.55  
 
The current regulatory system itself discourages R&D, however, because it is treated as an operating cost, 
not as capital investment, and any efficiency savings are clawed back by the regulator at the end of each 5-
year price cap period. So it is in the interests of companies to reduce R&D as much as possible, in particular 
any R&D that does not have an immediate short-term return. As a result, according to the House of Lords 
report: ―many companies‘ research and developments budgets have all but disappeared‖. 56 
 
This is a common feature of privatised and liberalised sectors. R&D has very high returns, and even higher 
social returns, but is risky and the benefits may not be limited to the company that does the research. As a 
result: ―Private markets, including competitive markets, are expected systematically to under-provide R&D 
in relation to what is socially desirable‖ 57.  R&D policies typically require public finance, either through 
direct research funding or subsidies: the House of Lords report quotes the example of  Australia‘s  
government-funded Cooperative Research Centre Programme. 58 
 
5. Prices 
5.1. Prices 
The universal experience of water privatisation in the UK was a sharp increase in the cost of water. In cash 
terms, the average annual bill for water and sewerage rose from £120 per year in 1989 to £294 in 2006, an 
increase of 245% in 17 years. In real terms, it represents a rise of 39% over and above the general rate of 
inflation.  
 
The pattern of rises shows clearly that there was an initial rapid rise during the early 1990s, slower but still 
significant rises during the later 1990s, and then a one-off drop of about 12% in 2000, following the price 
review. The price reductions in the 1999 review were largely due to ‗clawing back‘ the overgenerous 
settlements of previous years. Prices then levelled out, but since 2004 have risen sharply once again, 
following a new price review. The increase from 2004-2006 is the highest rise over two years since 1993-
1994.  
 
A breakdown of the component elements in the water bills shows that operating costs have remained roughly 
constant in real terms (as noted above). The entire increase in customers‘ bills is due to the various elements 
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associated with capital – capital charges,  interest, and profits – which have approximately doubled, in 
real terms, over this period. 59  
 
Chart B. Average annual cost of water 1989-2004  
(£ real terms, 2006 prices, excluding general inflation) 
 
 
Source: OFWAT 2006 60 
 
 
Chart C. Annual rise in prices, 1989-2006 
Annual rise in real water prices
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5.2. International comparisons 
It is difficult to make international comparisons of household charges on a comparable basis. However, 
industrial users are invariably charged on a volumetric basis, with less adjustment for social policy reasons, 
and so international comparisons over time could be expected to show the impact of pricing by water 
companies.  
 
Results from a survey of these charges by consultancy firm NUS suggests that water in Britain has become 
relatively more expensive since privatisation. In 1988-89, the last year of public ownership, the NUS survey 
of water costs for industrial users showed that British companies paid relatively low charges for water: 
Britain was ―ninth in the NUS league table, behind five of its EC counterparts including Italy…. The NUS 
figures show that in 1988-89, the cost of water in the UK was less than half that in Australia and West 
Germany.‖62 In 2005 the corresponding NUS survey showed the UK was in third highest position, with costs 
nearly double those of Australia, 70% higher than in Italy, and only 18% lower than Germany and 23% 
behind Denmark. 63   
 
5.3. Impact on poor: threat of cut offs, inadequacy of support system 
Following privatisation there was a sharp rise in the number of households being disconnected. The rate 
tripled in the first 5 years, with 18,636 households disconnected in 1994.64 But there was widespread 
opposition to this practice on social and health grounds. When their powers to disconnect were curtailed, the 
companies started using the ‗pre-payment meter‘ for customers unable to pay their bills. This supplied water 
when charged with a card: otherwise the household would get no water. They thus operated as self-
disconnecting meters. By 1996 over 16,000 had been installed, according to OFWAT, which led to ―a 
startling increase in the number of hidden disconnections associated with these meters‖.  Birmingham city 
council successfully challenged the legality of the meters, and the 1999 Water Act confirmed this by making 
it illegal for water companies to disconnect customers‘ water supply, or to install pre-payment meters or 
‗trickle valves‘.65   
 
Nearly one-third of those on the lowest incomes are already having to pay more than 3% of their income for 
their water and sewerage bills, and a similar proportion of the unemployed, even on average income. The 
numbers paying above this level fell from 2000, but are now increasing, due to the new surge in water prices 
over and above inflation. The government treat this level of 3% of income as a ‗sustainability indicator‘, i.e. 
if people are paying more than 3% of their income for water then the price level is not sustainable. 66 
 
The only systems for assisting those with difficulties in paying resemble 19th century approaches. There is a 
set of highly restrictive rules for special assistance, which are publicly funded but administered by the private 
companies, and the companies themselves may also provide charitable handouts at their own discretion. The 
House of Commons Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, the House of Commons Environmental Audit 
Committee, and now the House of Lords have all argued that ―people suffering from serious difficulty in 
paying their bills should be helped through the benefits and tax credits system‖.67 
 
The private companies have nevertheless been pressing since 1999 for the restoration of their right to cut off 
non-paying customers, and/or install cut-off meters, claiming that the level of non-payment, and the size of 
outstanding debt, is too high. (since companies have now been found guilty of exaggerating these bad debt 
figures, the data they offer may be more questionable). The House of Lords report surprisingly responds to 
this pressure by recommending the use of  'trickle flow' meters to deal with the "completely unacceptable" 
problem of unpaid bills: ―water companies should be permitted to disconnect them partially from the water 
supply‖. 68 The report refers with approval to the practice of  water companies in Victoria, Australia, but 
appears unaware of a report which showed  arbitrary variation in company practices, with one company 
restricting nearly 2% of all its customers, with many of those restricted being so poor they were entitled to 
concessionary rates,  and one company restricting the water flow for over 14 days in most cases. 
69
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Table 4 Water poverty in England and Wales 2004 
 
 
Source: CCWater evidence to House of Lords 70 
 
6. Regulation and gaming 
Under the privatised system, the regulator, OFWAT, is responsible for setting price limits and incentives so 
that the companies, while making a profit, can deliver the service, and the prices, that consumers want. The 
water companies are responsible to their shareholders for achieving the best possible return. The system is 
intended to result in regulations which create incentives for the companies to improve their performance, but 
also creates incentives for the companies to try and arrive at a more favourable deal for themselves at the 
expense of consumers.  
6.1. ‘Unexpected’ savings on capital expenditure 
There is strong evidence that OFWAT has been unable to deal with active and persistent ‗gaming‘ by the 
companies in order to gain higher profit margins.  This gaming happens around the price caps set by 
OFWAT in the price reviews, which effectively set the level of water prices in England 5 years in advance. 
The companies submit their projections of expenditure and claim that they need to increase prices to cover 
this spending. OFWAT then has to try and make its own assessment of the accuracy of these forecasts, and 
then set the prices. The companies have every incentive to mislead the regulator, by exaggerating the capital 
expenditure necessary – then they get allowed to charge higher prices, but the real expenditure is lower, and 
so they can pocket the difference as increased profit.71 The whole process is in effect a game between the 
regulator and the companies. 72  
 
The process began to be noticeable in 1994, after OFWAT‘s first price review was finalised, and the 
companies‘ price caps for the next 5 years had been fixed. Some companies ‗discovered‘ that they had made 
‗capital efficiency‘ savings, or that they did not need to spend so much on capital expenditure in future. The 
companies, then made use of this to justify paying extra dividends 73: Yorkshire Water paid out an extra 
£50million in dividends justified by savings in its capital programme (OFWAT later suggested that 
Yorkshire Water PLC‘s failures to ensure a reliable supply during the drought of 1995, or to control leakage 
and flooding from sewers, had to be related to the company‘s dividend policy74); North West Water found 
£400m savings from capital efficiencies, and also increased dividends to shareholders rather than cutting 
prices; 75 Thames Water likewise passed the benefits of a £350m reduction in forecast expenditure to 
shareholders rather than customers: 
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"Britain's biggest water company is to cut its investment programme by £350 million - but it will not 
be passing on the savings to its 7 million customers. Thames Water has no plans for early price 
reductions or rebates. Instead consumers - whose bills have increased by 50 per cent since 
privatisation in 1989 - face yet another rise in April, by inflation plus 0.5 per cent. The latest price 
rise was decided by the industry regulator, Ofwat, during the five-yearly price review last year. It 
was based on a £2.1 billion capital investment plan agreed with the company. But now, six months 
after the review, Thames says its investment target is only £1.75bn - down £350m, or £70m a year - 
equivalent to £10 off every domestic bill.” 76   
For the period 1995-2000 as a whole, capital investment totalled £17.5 billion - 10%, or £1,900 million, less 
than had been assumed when OFWAT set the price limits. 77 This resulted in a corresponding boost to 
company profits. 
 
The pattern continued in the subsequent period, 2000-2005. This was again obvious after the first year: 
capital expenditure for 2000-2001 was £700 million below projected levels. The underspend continued 
during the rest of the period, and capital expenditure for the full period 2000-05 was around £1.7 billion 
lower than the assumptions underpinning price limits over the five years as a whole, at £17.7 billion, 
compared with the £19.4 billion assumed, a shortfall of 9%. This again provided a boost to profits. From the 
last ten years, the companies have enjoyed windfall profits of over £3.4 billion as a result of these 
underspends. As a result: ―Profits are at the highest levels that we have seen over the last five years.‖78 
 
The problem got even worse in 2005-2006, when the underspend in a single year reached nearly £1 billion, 
22% lower than the level assumed by OFWAT when setting the price limits: the regulator‘s comment on this 
shortfall was the mild observation that ―the companies concerned will face a stiff challenge if they are to 
deliver all the outputs required of them over the five-year period.‖ 79  Yet the same report notes that the 
companies managed to increase dividends to shareholders by a total of £700 million (£385million plus £313 
million in special dividends) – so all the increase in dividends, and more, was made possible by the shortfall 
in capital expenditure. 80 
Table 5 Using capital underspend to boost dividends 1995-2006 
Period Underspend as 
percentage  
Underspend/boost 
to profits  in 
£million 
1995/96-1999/2000 -10% -1,900 
2000/01-2004/05 -9% -1,500 
2004/05-2005/06 -22% -960 
TOTAL  -9.5% -4,360 
Source: OFWAT 2000, OFWAT 2005, OFWAT 2006  
 
The 2005 stakeholder survey contains a scathing summary of views on a key part of the process, mainly from 
the companies themselves: ―The cost base methodology is widely seen as flawed. It is open to gaming and 
different companies take different approaches. …. Many see it as unlikely that the wide variations in unit 
costs can be explained by efficiency.‖ 81 
6.2. Severn Trent and others: deceiving the regulator 
The recent scandals concerning Severn Trent and other companies also confirms the existence of gaming, 
which may involve illegal behaviour, and the difficulty for OFWAT in identifying it and countering it.  The 
scandal emerged as a result of whistle-blowing, and not as part of Ofwat‘s regulatory scrutiny. A manager, 
David Donnelly, said in 2004 that he had been instructed by his bosses to exaggerate  figures of debts owed 
by non-paying customers: Severn Trent denied this, and denied that customers had been overcharged.82   
 
A year and a half later, however, OFWAT produced a report on the allegations which ―found that Severn 
Trent Water had provided regulatory data that was either deliberately miscalculated or poorly supported. 
This led to price limits being set for the water company that were higher than necessary, which would have 
resulted in customers paying £42 million more by 2009-10.‖83  There were also allegations that Severn Trent 
had misrepresented information on leakage, which has been referred for examination to the Serious Fraud 
Office for a possible criminal prosecution – their investigation was still ongoing in May 2007.  
 
PSIRU University of Greenwich                                                                                                                        www.psiru.org 
09/07/2010  Page 15 of 45  
  
The allegations prompted further confessions and discoveries of erros. Southern Water confessed to having 
made mistakes about its responses to customers, and failure to make payments due to customers; the Serious 
Fraud Office investigated these too, but finally decided not to prosecute. 84 Thames Water 85 and Severn 
Trent itself 86  admitted that they had misrepresented data on its response to customer enquiries, which also 
affects customer bills; Tendring Hundred admitted it had made an ―accounting error‖ in its estimates of 
income from metered customers, and overcharged customers £5 per head as a result of this unfortunate 
mistake.
87
  
6.3. Profits, dividends and directors pay 
The water and sewerage companies have paid their owners good dividends ever since privatisation, but 2006 
has been notable for a significant rise in such payments. 88  In 2005-2006 dividends paid by the water and 
sewerage companies rose by over 64%, to a total of £1,797.7 million. The biggest increase in dividends came 
from Thames Water, whose parent company RWE was in the process of trying to sell. This is equivalent to 
over half of the total amount invested in water and sanitation by these same 10 companies the year before. 
Income of the highest paid directors, by contrast has ‗only‘ risen by 7.6% - still much faster than inflation or 
average earnings.   
Table 6 Dividend payments and highest paid director, 2005-2006 
 Dividends  Highest paid director 
 2006 2005 % change 2006 2005 % change 
Anglian 305.7 233.6 30.9 408.0 362.0 12.7 
Dwr Cymru 0.0 0.0 - 331.7 355.0 -6.6 
Northumbrian 73.8 67.6 9.2 278.5 250.8 11.0 
Severn Trent 234.3 162.0 44.6 973.8 708.2 37.5 
South West 197.9 79.5 148.9 232.0 231.0 0.4 
Southern 44.8 43.4 3.2 203.0 254.0 -20.1 
Thames 276.0 45.8 502.6 397.0 385.0 3.1 
United Utilities 344.7 317.5 8.6 791.5 814.0 -2.8 
Wessex 52.2 42.1 24.0 186.0 173.0 7.5 
Yorkshire 268.3 100.2 167.8 175.0 164.0 6.7 
Total 1797.7 1091.7 64.7 3976.5 3697.0 7.6 
Source: Company annual reports 
 
6.4. 25 year concessions, plus 25 years notice of termination: eternal private monopolies 
There is no competition in the water industry. The private water companies hold regional monopolies, 
created by the act of privatisation in 1989, when the companies were sold to private shareholders complete 
with statutory rights to enjoy these monopolies. There was thus no competition for these monopolies in the 
first place. The Water Act 1988 specified that these monopolies are in fact concessions, lasting 25 years from 
the date of privatisation, and thus due to expire in 2014, so at least in principle it would be possible to either 
terminate or invite tenders for the licenses, as happens in France when private concessions come to an end.   
 
The 1988 Act did not provide for what would happen at the expiry of the concessions, but placed some 
constraints on the ability of ministers to terminate them. The Water Act 1992 introduced a much stronger 
constraint: government ministers had to give companies at least 10 years notice before terminating these 
concessions. In 2002, OFWAT lengthened this period even further, to 25 years. The stated purpose of the 
proposal was to create stability and security: “Ofwat today published proposals to reduce regulatory 
uncertainty in the water industry by increasing the minimum ten-year notice period for the termination of a 
company licence to 25 years……Under the current arrangements notice would have to be given by 2004 for 
licences to be terminated by 2014. OFWAT Director General Philip Fletcher said the approach of 2004 was 
creating uncertainty for the water industry, which was likely to drive up the costs of raising finance. Mr 
Fletcher said: "Customers' interests are best served by a stable regulatory environment that keeps costs 
down. The longer notice period will enable companies and their investors to plan ahead more securely."  89   
 
The change was proposed in a consultation document on 30 July 2002, and implemented, without publishing 
any responses to that consultation, in October 2002, by inserting a new clause into the license of all the water 
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companies. 90 The timing of the consultation effectively minimised the opportunity for public and 
parliamentary debate, because parliament was already suspended for the summer holidays, and all comments 
were required by 24th September, before parliament reconvened again.  It is not known what representations 
were made, as OFWAT never published them. Indeed the consultation paper itself was removed from the 
OFWAT website by the end of September 2002.  All that remains is the press statement issued at the same 
time. 91 The change was welcomed by United Utilities: ―we welcome the decision to change companies‘ 
licences so that the minimum notice period of termination will be 25 years rather than 10 years.‖92  
 
The change certainly creates greater security for the companies. It means that a decision to submit the current 
monopolies to tender for the first time ever, or a decision to end the private monopolies altogether, would 
take 25 years to implement, in which time it could be reversed by any one of at least 5 different 
governments. If the clause remains, it effectively provides a government guarantee which protects the 
privatised companies in perpetuity. This is in sharp contrast to France, which used to permit indefinitely long 
private concessions, but in the 1990s changed the law to require the periodic submission of concessions to 
tendering, and limited the duration of concessions to a maximum of 20 years.  
6.5. Private regulation  
Although regulation is the only way in which the public interest can be protected under the privatised 
system, the extent of public participation and ability to influence the process is severely limited. The 
regulator issues papers on which the public and various stakeholders are invited to make submissions, but the 
companies themselves are not subject to public examination. OFWAT and the companies consult and discuss 
regularly on various issues.  The companies own data is protected by commercial confidentiality.  
 
This is a great contrast to the model of regulation in the USA, in which, surprisingly, the companies are 
subject to much greater scrutiny. Companies are required to make detailed submissions to justify any 
proposed price increase; they have to provide all information and documents requested by any member of the 
public or any employee, including supporting documents; public hearings are held, at which all documents 
and arguments can be challenged by anyone;  every decision of the regulator must be supported by published 
documentation; companies are legally obliged to pass cost reductions on to the public in the form of lower 
prices; citizens can initiate investigations of  utility prices if they suspect excessive profits are being made. 93 
 
The system in England and Wales, by contrast, allows none of this. Instead, OFWAT publishes technical 
papers for consultation at various stages of the process. This practice appears to suit the needs of the 
companies and investors, but fails to respond to, or even be intelligible to, consumers or environmental 
groups, according to the responses to a survey of stakeholders in 2005. 94  
 
In relation to transparency of the system, and OFWAT‘s clearer explanation of its methodology: ―This was 
highly regarded by the water companies, and also very much appreciated by the City respondents‖ . But the 
consumer representatives at Watervoice saw it differently: ―WaterVoice is much less happy than other 
groups with transparency. Its main concern around transparency of decisions seems to arise from an inability 
to get information about the reasoning for the Draft Determination following the Final Business Plan.‖ This 
is the crucial stage where OFWAT proposes price limits in response to the companies‘ forecasts: if the 
connection between the two is a mystery to the consumer body set up to represent consumer interests, then 
the regulatory process is failing badly. 95 
 
Consumer and environmentalists spelled out their view of the process more sharply: 
―WaterVoice sees the review process as structurally unable to take proper account of customer 
interests, rather than this being a result of Ofwat‘s failure to follow proper procedure. Their view is 
that in the way the review process is structured City and government views are accorded more 
importance than customer needs, and issues of affordability and social justice are not included in the 
 groups have concerns about whether all discussions between Ofwat and 
government were fully in the public domain. They see Ofwat as selective of information used in 
consultations and feel that Ofwat does not take sufficient account of either customer or 
environmental interests.‖ 96 
 
The same discrepancy emerges again in relation to communications:  
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―City communications were very highly regarded, with City briefings and so on very much 
appreciated; this benefited both the City institutions themselves and also the water companies 
appreciated the more certain financial environment.  
While recognising the difficulties Ofwat faces in communicating with a wide range of audiences, 
respondents in consumer groups and WaterVoice in particular raised  concerns about the level of 
knowledge necessary to understand Ofwat publications, and suggested that more consumer-friendly 
publications might be beneficial.‖ 97 
 
One such example can be seen in the recent joint paper issued by OFWAT and OFGEM on financing 
networks, which deals with the very significant issue of financing capital investments, received 36 responses 
nearly all of which were from the companies in the industry, and a few financial investors and consultants. 
There was no response on behalf of consumers or employees in the water sector or from any elected body,  
except for one single response from the consumer body for energy, Energywatch.98  
OFWAT has also been criticised by Environmental Agency chief executive Barbara Young, who complained 
in December 2004 to a parliamentary committee that OFWAT has begun to take environmental decisions, by 
dropping or deferring schemes, even though they were required under EU law and UK policy. She said that 
Ofwat's behaviour had upset the balance of power in price reviews and had 'significantly diminished our role 
and the role of the minister'. The agency said the situation had been exacerbated by Ofwat's refusal to put 
into the public domain even the criteria against which it judged whether green schemes were acceptable, 
unacceptable or in need of further scrutiny, because Ofwat believed such information was commercially 
sensitive.99   
More recently, OFWAT has been criticised by the Public Accounts Committee of the House of Commons for 
a series of weaknesses, including slowness to use its full enforcement powers, failure to collect reliable data 
on water consumption, leakage, and efficiency savings.100  
7. Droughts, water shortages and leakage 
7.1. Predictable droughts and water stress 
The water shortages of 2006 have highlighted the problems of providing adequate water supplies, especially 
in the east and southeast of England, and provoked a large volume of public criticism of the water 
companies. The drought of 1995 also led to problems and widespread public criticisms.  The companies 
mostly present these as short-term problems, related to water shortage in a particularly dry summer, with 
short-term solutions such as hosepipe bans (although one company, Folkestone and Dover, has successfully 
won permission to make metering compulsory for all its customers).  
 
The problems however are not short-term. The Environment Agency presented a detailed report in 2002, 
which showed that there are long-term problems in England of water supplies which are inadequate to meet 
demand. It proposed long-term solutions, with priority given to controlling demand, through reducing 
leakage, and reducing the volume of water used by consumers.   
 
The problems have also been well known for many years, ever since privatisation. In 1990, just after the sale 
of the water companies, the Guardian reported: ―Britain could be said to be in a state of hydrological 
stress….in some districts, particularly in the east, only four or five of the last 26 months have been wetter 
than average….What is also giving rise for concern is the very low groundwater or underground water levels 
which are well below average in all regions but notably low in eastern regions …..the water mains leak 
alarmingly: South West Water loses 32 per cent of everything it supplies, Thames 25 per cent, North West 
up to 30 per cent, a total in England of Wales of about 12 billion litres a day or enough for London and 
more.‖ 101   
 
The question to be addressed is therefore whether the water companies have consistently failed to address a 
long-term problem, and in particular why leakage levels remain so high in a situation of long-term scarcity. 
The same article in 1990 advanced an explanation for this: ―….the water companies curtsy to the idea of 
repairing their leaks but there is no real incentive for them to do so because water is not priced at its real 
environmental costs‖. 102   
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7.2. Limitations of the economic level of leakage 
Regulation of leakage fails to correct these problems. The principle mechanism used to regulate leakage is 
the ―economic level of leakage‖ (ELL), which is defined as the level at which it would cost more to make 
further reductions than to produce the water from another source. 103 This has a number of limitations.  
 
Firstly, it gives no weight to the general case for conserving water supplies to reduce the stress on the 
environment: Thames Water is proposing a new reservoir and a new desalination plant, whilst still allowing 
leakage of around one-third of its water and failing to meet the targets set by Ofwat‖. 104 (The concept of 
economic level of leakage has even been used to argue for an increase in leakage levels. In 1995, a World 
Bank team criticised  low leakage levels (between 1% and 5%) in Germany, and recommended that the 
country should allow higher leakage to develop, until the costs of plugging the leaks was equal to the price 
of the water saved.105)   
 
Secondly, the relative costs of stopping leaks or using more water vary between companies, and so each 
company uses an agreed formula to works out its own ELL: but it is then treated as a commercial secret, and 
the ELLs are not published, and so there is no scope for public debate around these targets.  
 
Thirdly, in practice, the method accepts the current levels of leakage, because the water companies are now 
operating at or very close to the economic level of leakage.106   
 
The House of Lords report concluded that more stringent leakage targets need to be set, based on a broader 
concept of ―sustainable level of leakage‖, which would also take greater account of the environmental and 
social implications, determined after public debate.107 
7.3. Leakage rates in England and Wales 
It is now well-known that the water companies in England and Wales on average lose nearly a quarter of 
their treated water through leaks, that the worst company, Thames, loses one-third, and that in at least some 
parts of the cities the leakage rates are even higher. OFWAT produces regular reports on leakage, based on 
data collected from the private companies. The latest data shows leakage rates of between 13% and 33%, 
with an average of 23% across all the companies in England and Wales.  OFWAT  
Table 7 Leakage rates, 2004-2005  
 Leakage rate 
(% of water 
lost)  
Anglian & HPL 18 
Welsh Water 26 
Essex & Suffolk 14 
Northumbrian 22 
United Utilities 26 
Severn Trent 26 
South West 18 
Southern 16 
Thames 33 
Wessex 20 
Yorkshire & York 23 
Water Supply Companies  
Bournemouth & West Hampshire 13 
Bristol 18 
Cambridge 19 
Dee Valley 16 
Folkestone 17 
MidKent 18 
Portsmouth 17 
South East Water 18 
South Staffs 22 
Sutton & East Surrey 15 
Tendring Hundred 17 
Three Valleys/North Surrey 17 
INDUSTRY TOTAL 23 
Source: OFWAT, House of Lords 
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7.4. Leakage rates and international comparisons 
The causes of leakage are obviously to be found in local conditions – the state of the pipes, joints, valves and 
pumps through which water travels, and these in turn derive from local factors such as the age and materials 
of the pipes. Leakage rates themselves are also affected by the length of the piped network – the longer the 
network the more likelihood there is of leakage – and by local practices: for example, reducing the mains 
water pressure reduces leakage, although at the expense of steady flows from the taps.  Hence the wide 
variation of reported leakage rates, even within England,  
 
Nevertheless, the problem of wasted resources is a common one, and factors such as age of networks apply 
to many cities, so international comparisons of leakage rates can be helpful in identifying whether leakage is 
taken more or less seriously in than in other cities and countries. Comparisons are sometimes made at the 
level of countries, but outside the UK better data is more often available for cities (or regions) where a single 
water company – private or municipal – is responsible for water supply. The comparisons which follow use  
data gathered by OFWAT 108, data from a recent EC research project, Watertime 109, and a recent study by 
the Asian Development Bank 110, it is possible to present some comparisons with cities in continental 
Europe, Asia, and the USA.  
 
The evidence suggests that leakage rates in England and Wales are in the same area as leakage in the former 
communist countries of eastern Europe, or the better performing cities in Asia, but below the rates achieved 
in many cities in northern and western Europe.   
 Europe 
The chart below sets out data on a number of cities in Europe. Some of it comes from the OFWAT 
international comparison, and some from the Watertime project.  The UK average, and the companies 
covering the major cities in England, are all at the higher end of this list, in the same area as figures for the 
eastern European cities. Most of the north European cities – in Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden and even 
Poland, have leakage rates under 20%.  
 
The relatively low leakage rate for Paris demonstrates the feasibility of reducing leakage rates. Paris reduced 
its water losses from over 60 million cubic meters in 1989 to less than 20 million cubic meters in 2004, a cut 
of two-thirds. Because the level of consumption also fell over the same period, the fall in the leakage rate 
was less dramatic but was still halved, from about 20% in 1989 to about 10% in 2004. 111  
Chart D. European cities compared with English companies  
PSIRU University of Greenwich                                                                                                                        www.psiru.org 
09/07/2010  Page 20 of 45  
  
Leakage rates, European cities and UK companies
2
3
4
5
6
8
10
10
10
13
15
15
17
18
20
20
21
22
22
23
26
32
32
46
46
23
26
26
33
40
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
WMN Utrecht
Brabant
Copenhagen
DZH South Holland
Vitens
WML Limburg
Milan
Paris
Malmo
Hameenlinna
Stockholm
Gdansk
Helsinki
Tampere
Bologna
Cordoba
Mancomunidad del Sureste
Gothenburg
Oslo
Szeged
England/Wales ave
Arezzo
Severn Trent
United Utilities
Tallinn
Vilnius
Thames Water
Thames (London)
Timisoara
Bucharest
 
Sources: OFWAT, Watertime 
 
 USA 
A comparison with the leakage rates of companies operating water services in some cities in the USA shows 
that the English company average of 23% is higher than the mid-range and average (20%) for the USA 
companies. The English companies covering the largest cities are at the high end.  Five of the USA 
companies in the table – Pittsburgh, Chicago, Missouri, New Jersey and Indiana – were also owned by 
Thames Water (although at the time of writing in 2007 they have been sold). 
 Asia 
The English companies' performance looks better when compared with cities in Asia. Only three out of 18  
cities in a 2004 study record a worse figure than the average for England and Wales; Thames Water‘s 
leakage rate is about the same as the average figure for the 18 Asian cities (34%), in between Ulaanbaatar 
(Mongolia) and Karachi (Pakistan),.  There are two reasons, however, why this comparison is less favourable 
than it appears. Firstly, the figures for Asian cities are for ‗non-revenue water‘ (NRW) , which includes not 
only leakage but water which is ‗stolen‘ from the system or not paid for. That is a negligible element in the 
UK, but is a significant factor for many Asian cities. In Colombo, for example, the NRW figure for  Greater 
Colombo of 35% is made up of 23% leakage and 12% illegal connections and other forms of non-
payment.112  So on leakage alone, Colombo may be performing at about the same level as the English and 
Welsh companies – and better than Thames Water.  Secondly, two of the worst leakage rates in this table are 
recorded by cities whose water is partly managed by English companies. In Manila, where the overall 
leakage rate is 62%, half the city has been managed since 1995 by a joint venture (Manila Water) partly 
owned by United Utilities. In Jakarta, half the city has been managed by a Thames Water subsidiary since 
1997: the leakage rate in Thames‘ half of the city is 48%.  The water shortages experienced in Jakarta in 
summer 2006 also have a familiar ring:  
―Water customers represented by the People's Coalition for the Right to Water (KRUHA) 
complained Tuesday about the service provided by the city's two water companies. They urged the 
Jakarta administration to end its partnership with foreign firms PT Palyja and PT Thames PAM Jaya 
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(TPJ). "PT Palyja and PT Thames PAM Jaya simply haven't been performing well. The problem 
with the water shortages in Jakarta lies in their bad management, but instead they blame the dry 
season's effect on Jatiluhur Dam, where we get about 80 percent of our water supply," said Hamong 
Santono, KRUHA's coordinator……. the water shortage was still the problem of the companies. 
"What we cannot understand is why the two companies couldn't anticipate this problem.‖113 
7.5. OFWAT resists merging of water resources in south-east England 
The problem of water resource management in the UK may have been made worse, especially in the south-
east, by OFWAT‘s resistance to mergers. The south-east is characterised by a patchwork of water-only 
companies, whose boundaries date back to long before privatisation (and even the regional reform of 1974).  
The area is now subject to major water stress, to such an extent that the residents of Folkestone and Dover 
are subject to compulsory metering.114 There have been a series of proposals in 1997, 2002, and again in 
2007 to merge some of the companies in this area, with a key argument being the potential benefits from 
sharing water resources.  All of these have been resisted by OFWAT, and the merger plans of 1997 and 2002 
were rejected.  
 
OFWAT‘s rationale for this opposition to mergers has been to maintain a sufficient number of companies for 
the ‗virtual competition‘ exercise, whereby OFWAT compares the performance of different companies in 
order to set targets (although, as the previous sections have discussed, the benefits of this exercise are 
dubious). But in resisting these mergers, OFWAT has perpetuated an inefficient structure, especially in 
relation to water resource management: without that opposition, such mergers could have happened earlier 
and provided greater water security for the Southeast.  
 
In 1997, the two water multinationals (Generale des Eaux and SAUR) who then owned most of the small 
companies, including Folkestone and Dover, proposed a merger, which they justified by arguing that ―the 
merger would result in much improved management and use of water resources in the area.‖115 That merger 
was blocked, following opposition from OFWAT, which argued that the resource issues could be met by 
contracts between companies.  The Financial Times described the decision as ―baffling both the City and the 
environmentalists‖: the companies had argued that  the merger ― would optimise the use of scarce water 
resources in the south of England…[and] delay the construction of an environmentally unfriendly reservoir 
by splitting Mid Kent's resources between two companies owned by Generale and Saur on either side of it: 
Folkestone & Dover and South East Water‖, but the decision was made because the competition authorities 
agreed with OFWAT‘s views on competition.116 
 
In 2002 there was a proposed takeover of Southern water by Vivendi (now Veolia), which already owned 
Folkestone and Dover: again, this was opposed by OFWAT, and rejected. But the Consumers Council told 
the House of Lords that: 
 
―With the existence of more than 20 water companies across England and Wales, the structure of the 
water supply network is fragmented. Although many companies operate bulk supply agreements 
with neighbouring companies, there is little scope to transfer water on a regional basis as ring mains 
through more than one company area do not exist. We think there is a strong case to look at 
integrating of supplies across company borders in water stretched areas such as the south-east to help 
address water distribution problems. For example, had the proposed acquisition of Southern Water 
by Vivendi Water UK Plc been approved by the Secretary of State, the completion of a ring main 
around the periphery of Kent would have been an option for the newly formed company.‖ 117 
 
OFWAT also argued against the latest proposal – a merger between Mid-Kent Water and Southeast Water – 
on the familiar grounds that it would lose comparators for its virtual competition exercise, and dismissed the 
arguments for water resources in one paragraph, repeating its view that the resource issues could be met by 
contracts between companies and saying that ―there is evidence of co-operation between companies to 
manage resources in the south east‖. 118  However, this latest proposal was finally approved by the 
Competition Commission in 2007, despite OFWAT‘s opposition.  A consultant‘s report for the Commission 
had emphasised the benefits in terms of better management of water resources: 
 
―…a number of significant benefits in managing water resources in the South east of England 
…..which could not be achieved unless a merger was in place…an improvement in the security of 
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supply of customers in the enlarged region in the short term, a removal of risk surrounding existing 
or alternative schemes, and a removal of the supply-demand imbalance in the longer term. The 
merging of the two companies would allow a long-term regional strategy to be developed….a 
number of cross-border strategic interconnections could be put in place… this would provide a 
regional basis for transferring water from areas of surplus to areas of deficit….This level of long-
term strategic planning would not be possible without a merger.‖ 119    
 
The Environment Agency also supported the resource benefits of the merger, implicitly criticising OFWAT‘s 
complacency over supply contracts: ―companies preferred to be self-sufficient …. this might explain why 
resource development had taken precedence over demand management or sharing of supplies…. the merger 
would increase flexibility in the area and the increased connectivity between the two companies would 
optimize the small resource surpluses that were available. This would not be as easily achieved with two 
separate companies….negotiating with fewer partners to try to come to a consensus on key issues would be 
much easier.‖ 120  
8. Accountability 
8.1. Democratic deficit 
Under the current system in England and Wales neither the water companies nor the regulator are 
accountable to elected representatives. Elsewhere in Europe and north America, water remains the 
responsibility of municipalities, and so elected local councillors are responsible to the public, through local 
elections, for the water service – even if the operations are outsourced to a private company. In the great 
majority of cases, the water companies are themselves wholly owned by the municipalities, and therefore the 
companies themselves are also directly accountable to elected representatives. 
 
There is by contrast a total democratic deficit in the UK.  
 
The water companies themselves are accountable only to their shareholders, who are investors concerned 
with the return on their investment. (Even in Wales, the company is accountable only to a board of 
appointed, not elected, individuals). Neither the companies nor the shareholders are subject to any 
democratic accountability. 
 
More surprisingly, OFWAT itself is not accountable to ministers, nor to parliament. The constitutional status 
of OFWAT is as a non-ministerial government department. It fulfils the functions that one would expect a 
government ministry to perform, but without being controlled by a minister, and this is what makes it 
‗independent‘. Ministers cannot instruct OFWAT – they can only submit their views to OFWAT, and hope 
that OFWAT takes them into account, like anyone else in the country. Parliamentary committees can invite 
OFWAT to give evidence, but OFWAT is not accountable to parliament through ministers.  
 
Unlike the health service, or the Home Office, where government ministers have to take responsibility for 
the service, in the case of water the secretary of state for the environment can simply say to parliament that it 
is not his or her responsibility, but that of OFWAT.  OFWAT employs 188 people at a total annual cost of 
£10.6m , but this is not paid for out of taxation, but out of license fees charged to the private companies (the 
costs of which are recovered by the companies through higher prices to consumers), so is not accountable for 
using money raised through taxes authorised by parliament .121  The only way that parliament can hold 
regulators to account is by changing the legislation concerning the sector122. Short of this, OFWAT can only 
be subjected to instruction through judicial review, by bringing a court case arguing that it has exceeded or 
misused its powers.  
8.2. No coherent public policy machinery 
One result of the lack of democratic accountability is that there is no clear forum for debating public interests 
in policies on water. In practice OFWAT is making a series of policy decisions on crucial public interest 
matters such as levels of  investment and prices, but cannot claim to represent the public interest. The 
Environment Agency is equally detached. The private companies can only be expected to represent their 
shareholders‘ interests. DEFRA has an arms length relationship with the regulators and no direct relationship 
with the water companies.  
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This problem is made worse because of the fragmentation of bodies with different responsibilities in the 
sector.  
 
There are no national or regional bodies which bring all the different interests and stakeholders together, nor 
are there national or regional forums for public debate of those policies. The recent House of Lords report 
gave a succinct summary of the situation:  
 
―Responsibility for water management is dispersed and unclear. We need clearer lines of 
responsibility, greater accountability and more effective funding procedures…. The current 
institutional arrangements in England and Wales allocate responsibility for different aspects of water 
management to water companies, OFWAT, the EA and the DWI. The boundaries between the 
respective responsibilities of each organisation are by no means clear.‖ 123 
 
The House of Lords also pointed out that despite the existence of special consumer complaints machinery 
and a special bureaucracy on consumer issues, the system does not provide public mechanisms for 
consumers as citizens to influence policy decisions: ―consumers of water and those interested in the water 
environment in England and Wales have little direct contact with the water service provider—nor do they 
have any influence on the companies‘ modi operandi or the standards with which the companies must 
comply. This lack of direct contact risks impairing attempts to engage effectively with the public and 
influence their behaviour, and contrasts with the strong public involvement in water services in countries 
such as France and the United States of America‖.  
 
As a solution, the House of Lords recommended the creation of regional boards to draw up long-term water 
management plans, with representatives form the existing regulators and consumer bodies, acting as advisors 
to the national regulators and the Regional Assemblies - which are made up of 70% elected councillors and 
30% stakeholders.124 This would at least represent a first step towards reintroducing bodies which had some 
electoral and stakeholder representation.  
 
8.3. Ownership and accountability: private equity funds 
Even the private companies themselves have become less accountable. As discussed earlier, there has been a 
steady trend to replace equity with debt financing. As a result, an increasing number of the water companies 
are now owned by private equity (PE) funds, which specialise in buying companies using a large amount of 
debt (‗leveraged buyouts‘). This form of ownership has even less accountability than stock exchange 
companies, because there is no obligation to publish detailed annual reports and quarterly updates (although 
OFWAT continue to receive a separate set of annual accounts for the water company). 125 PE funds have also 
been the subject of great criticism for their readiness to make cuts in operations in order to generate 
substantial profits for the financial partners of the PE firms themselves: a recent study concluded that 
leveraged buyouts consistently result in cuts in wages for the workforce.126    
 
This issue has been highlighted by the takeover of Thames Water by a large PE fund, Macquarie, through a 
new holding company called Kemble water. In response to an OFWAT consultation paper on the proposed 
structure for running the company, the consumer council for the region stated bluntly: 
 
―The ownership and voting structure ….. is Byzantine, and does little to convince us that Kemble 
will act in the best interests of Thames Water and its customers.  The multi-layered structure seems 
to be designed to allow investors to extract as much as they can from Thames Water on the grounds 
that they need to ensure that all of the various holding companies receive ‗appropriate‘ returns.  We 
fear that Thames Water will be seen as a cash cow to be milked for all it is worth.  This would not be 
in the short, medium or long term interests of the company, its employees and its customers.‖ 127 
 
Only 5 of the large water and sewerage companies are now part of stock exchange quoted companies, and 
financial investors hold dominant stakes in 3 of these; only one of the water-only companies is stick 
exchange quoted, and that also has a dominant financial investor.  Even the multinational water companies 
have retreated, so that only 4 of the smaller water-only companies are owned by French groups specialising 
in water.  
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Table 8 Ownership of water companies in Engalnd and Wales, April 2007 
(Type of owner: SEC = stock exchange quoted (UK); M = multinational; PE=private equity; NPC=not-for-
profit company; P= privately owned company) 
Company Owner Country Type 
of 
owner 
Comments 
Anglian Water Osprey/AWG UK PE Consortium of 3 PE funds, inc. 3i 
Northumbrian Water  UK SEC 25% owned by Ontario Teachers Pensions, 15% by 
fund managers Amvescap, 5% by Barclays Bank 
North West Water United Utilities UK SEC  
Severn Trent Water Severn Trent UK SEC  
Southern Water Royal Bank of Scotland UK PE Owned by SWC: RBS owns 49% of SWC (PPI 
Investments is other main shareholder). 
South West Water Pennon Group UK SEC Pennon is 30% owned by 5 financial investors 
Thames Water Macquarie Australia PE  
Welsh Water Glas Cymru UK NPC  
Wessex Water YTL Malaysia M  
Yorkshire Water Kelda UK SEC Two PE investors buy 7% stakes in April 2007 
     
Bournemouth and West 
Hampshire Water 
Biwater UK P Private company, operates internationally, but not 
in EU outside UK. 
Bristol Water Agbar/Suez ES/FR M  
Cambridge Water Cheung Kong 
Infrastructure 
Hong 
Kong 
M  
Cholderton Water Cholderton Estate UK P Private family owned 
Dee Valley - UK SEC 35% of shares owned by Axa SA. 
Folkestone and Dover  Veolia FR M  
Mid Kent Water UTA and HDF Australia PE Utilities Trust of Australia (UTA); Hastings 
Diversified Utilities Fund (HDF). Bought Swan 
Group, the holding company of Mid Kent Water. 
Swan also owns 51% of Halcrow water Services. 
Portsmouth Water South Downs Capital UK PE South Downs Capital  is 36% owned by 
SMIF/Land Securities (PE). SMIF=Secondary 
Market Infrastructure Fund. SMIF itself was 
bought by Star Fund (PE) in 2003, sold in 2006 to 
Land Securities (PE) 
South East Water UTA and HDF Australia PE Macquarie bought South East Water from SAUR in 
2003; sold it to UTA/HFM in October 2006, prior 
to o purchase of Thames Water. 
South Staffordshire 
Water 
Arcapita Bank Bahrein PE Formerly known as First Islamic Investment Bank 
Sutton & East Surrey 
Water 
Aqueduct Capital DE PE Aqueduct Capital is part of Deutsche Bank. Bought 
holding company  East Surrey Holdings Group 
(ESH) for £189m in 2006  from Kellen 
Acquisitions Ltd – part of Terra Firma. Kellen had 
bought ESH only in October 2005, and then sold 
off gas companies. 
Tendring Hundred Veolia FR M  
Three Valleys Veolia FR M  
 
9. Majority support for public ownership 
The British public still believes that water should be in the public sector, 17 years after the water companies 
of England and Wales were privatised.  In June 2006, 56% of people in an opinion poll believed that the 
country ―would have fewer problems with water supplies if the industry was renationalised and the private 
companies replaced with a government-owned water board‖, while 38% disagreed. The results were 
consistent across all age groups and regions (see Annex 1 for detailed results).128    
 
This poll was taken in the context of water shortages, drought orders, restrictions on consumption, high 
levels of reported leakage, companies reporting increased profits and higher pay for directors, while water 
prices continue to rise, but it is consistent with all previous polls in Britain, in which there has always been a 
large majority in favour of public ownership of the water industry. 
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Chart E. Popular support for public ownership of water industry 
Support for public ownership of water in England and 
Wales, 2006
Agree
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Don't know
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Source: BBC Daily Politics Show Poll Fieldwork : June 14th-15th 2006. Conducted by Populus.  
   http://www.populuslimited.com/pdf/2006_06_20_Daily_Politics.pdf  (see Annex) 
 
This public opposition to water privatisation was apparent throughout the 1980s when water privatisation 
was being proposed and introduced.  The first proposals in 1985 were widely criticised: even a Financial 
Times editorial suggested that: ―the water industry has many special characteristics which seem to justify 
public ownership‖.129 A vigorous campaign against the policy was led by the unions, along with ―a wide 
range of different interest groups…[including] some naturally sympathetic bodies such as Labour local 
authorities, but mostly non-political organisations, such as the Countryside Commission, the National 
Farmers' Union, the British Pensioners' Association, Greenpeace, the River Thames Society and the Royal 
Society for the Protection of Birds.‖ 130  The  government decided in July 1986 to postpone the plans, 
because the policy could have been a serious political liability in the general  election expected the following 
year: ―it did not seem a particularly attractive policy to introduce so close to an election‖. 131  A poll in 
December 1986 showed that 71% were opposed to water privatisation, and only 21% in favour. 132    
 
After the government won the June 1987 election, the Financial Times political columnist observed that 
―The Tories won the election largely because of their past record and a dislike of the alternatives. They 
would be mistaken to assume that the success implies popular support for their agenda.‖ 133  This was 
confirmed when proposals for water privatisation were relaunched: despite the election result, polls in 
October and November 1987 showed opposition at the level of  64% to 65% 134, and by December 1988 the 
majority against water privatisation had risen to 75% (electricity privatisation, which was taking place at the 
same time, was almost equally unpopular, with 69% opposed) 135.  The Times commented of these 
privatisation plans: ―by and large the public sees little point and only disadvantages in them. They seem 
simply doctrinaire.‖ 136 
 
The opposition partly reflected scepticism about the effects of privatisation, with more than half expecting 
water services to get worse under privatisation, 137 but also a stubborn continuation of a belief in the 
importance of the public sector.  A January 1988 poll showed a majority favouring a "mainly socialist 
society, in which public interests and a controlled economy predominated, and where caring for others was 
more highly rewarded than creation of wealth‖ 138; and a June 1988  poll showed that 40% ―felt 
nationalisation gave ordinary people a larger stake in the country‖ against 35% preferring privatisation.139 
After a decade with Mrs Thatcher as prime minister, in May 1989, polls showed that British people wanted 
the public sector to be larger, not smaller:  38% thought more sectors should be in public ownership, 41% 
felt that things were about right, and only 14% thought that more industries should be privatised.140 
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Two very large advertising campaigns tried to change public opinion. The water authorities spent £22million 
promoting privatisation during 1989, and the government then spent a further £22million to promote the 
actual sale. 141  This expenditure was double that of the largest campaign for a commercial brand that year, 
the £20million spent by Nestle to promote sales of Nescafe.  Despite this, opposition to water privatisation as 
recorded by the polls rose to 79% in July 1989 142, 72% in November 1989 143, and remained at 71% in 
October 1990, nearly a year after privatisation. 144 Water in England and Wales was nevertheless privatised 
in 1989.  
 
The actual experience of privatisation reinforced the unpopularity of the policy. The companies gained a bad 
reputation for excessive pricing and profits. As summarised later by a parliamentary committee: “After 
privatisation profits started to soar in real terms—between 1990/91 and 1997/8 the pre-tax profits of the ten 
water and sewerage companies increased by 147% at a time when customers faced continual price rises. 
Water and sewerage prices rose respectively by 36% and 42% from 1988-1998 (in real terms) with the bulk 
of the increase occurring in the period up to 1994-1995. The industry faced a public outcry in relation to 
high levels of directors' pay and profits…”145  
 
This view was not confined to a particular political perspective. The Daily Mail, a staunch supporter of the 
Conservative party, ran consistently critical coverage, typified by a feature in 1994 entitled ‗The Great water 
Robbery‘, which slated the companies on all counts: “In recent weeks the penny has been dropping that 
something has gone horrendously wrong with the privatisation of Britain's water  industry.    When it was 
privatised in 1989 the water  industry was hailed as the jewel in the crown of the Thatcherite privatisation 
programme….In reality, as a string of reports have confirmed - including the latest    today from the 
National Consumer Council - the water  industry has become the    biggest rip-off in Britain. Water  bills, 
both to households and industry, have soared. And the directors    and shareholders of Britain's top ten 
water  companies have been able to use    their position as monopoly suppliers to pull off the greatest act of 
licensed robbery in our history ”. 146 
 
In the early 1990s, the government also proposed to privatise water in Scotland, but public opposition there 
was even higher: successive polls showed 91% 
147
 or 86% 
148
 of people definitely opposed. In March 1994 
Strathclyde Regional Council, covering nearly half the population of Scotland, organised a postal referendum 
on the issue: seven out of ten  voters returned papers, a total of 1.2 million people, of whom 97% rejected 
water privatisation. 149 The government finally abandoned the attempt to privatise Scottish water, and issued 
an emphatic leaflet at Scottish local elections in May 1994 with the headline ―Tories say no to 
privatisation.‖150  Public resistance  to water privatisation remains high in Scotland: a poll in 2004 found that 
70% are still opposed.151   
 
In Northern Ireland, the UK government is introducing new water charges which are extremely unpopular 
with all sections of the community.   Even a majority of small businesses were opposed to privatisation. 152 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart F. Public opposition to water privatisation in Britain, 1986-1993 
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Percentage opposed to water privatisation in England and Wales, and Scotland, 1986-1993
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Source:   Opinion polls reported in Financial Times, Guardian, Times, Independent, Scotsman and Herald, 1986-1993 
(see text).  
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10. Conclusions: improvements through public ownership 
10.1. Investment, efficiency, accountability and policy making 
This review of experience with water privatisation in England and Wales has identified a series of problems 
with capital investment, the cost of capital, productivity, quality of labour, price rises, relations between the 
companies and the regulator, accountability and transparency, and policy formulation.  OFWAT addresses 
some of these issues in its papers and proposals, and attempts to improve and adjust its practice to deal with 
some of the problems. Many of the issues have also been considered by reports from the House of Lords.  
 
In all these discussions there is no consideration at all given to the possible gains from public ownership and 
operation of the water sector.  This is not surprising. Both OFWAT and the owners of the private companies 
have clear interests in maintaining a private system, and government policies have been firmly in favour of 
reducing the role of public ownership for over 20 years.  
 
But there are five reasons why the public debate should include serious consideration of the merits of 
reforming the water industry under public ownership. 
 
 Firstly, many of the economic problems identified in this review could be dealt with more effectively 
under public ownership. These include the cost of capital, where public sector debt is a more 
efficient way of financing the industry than shareholder capital; and the control over prices of an 
essential service, by eliminating private monopolies with incentives to exploit services.  
 
 Secondly, the political problems of lack of accountability and the need for coherent and public 
policy making on long-term investments, could be better addressed through public ownership, which 
would subject the whole sector to the scrutiny of elected representatives and open the industry to 
public debate.  
 
 Thirdly, water and sewerage systems are owned and run by the public sector in the great majority of 
countries in the world – no-one had followed the English and Welsh model of privatisation. Public 
ownership is not an obsolete way of providing water, but the normal way of providing water services 
in the 21st century, as it was throughout the 20th century.  
 
 Fourthly, public ownership would enable more coordinated and long-term management of water 
resources, including more flexible sharing and distribution of existing resources, and make it easier 
to develop a programme to reduce leakage instead of developing new reservoirs or desalination 
plants.   
 
 Finally, as demonstrated above, a substantial majority of people in the UK continue to express a 
clear preference for water to be in public ownership, and have never been convinced of the 
desirability of privatisation at any time before or after 1989. 
 
10.2. Returning water to the public sector 
The normal form for public ownership of water services in Europe and throughout the world is by local 
councils or municipalities, the same as in England and Wales before 1974.  To revive this structure now 
would mean breaking up the existing companies, and also recreating capacity to deal with water in local 
councils, and so there would be a lot of transaction costs.  
 
The existing regional companies could be transferred to public ownership, owned by the government. The 
new companies should be accountable to new Public Water Boards (PWBs), to replace the shareholder 
boards of the private water companies. The PWBs should include representatives of the government, as 
owners of the new companies; representatives from the county councils in the region covered by the 
companies; representatives from the Environment Agency; and representatives of stakeholders such as 
consumer bodies and trade unions. The PWBs could be built on the new Regional Assemblies, which have a 
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similar structure already. Below the PWBs would be much smaller management boards which would report 
to the PWB on a monthly basis. 
 
The opportunity should be taken to transform the transparency and accessibility of the new structure. The 
PWBs should reflect a new public openness and democratic accountability. All documents of the new public 
companies should be open to the public, including all contracts, except those that concerned individual 
employees. The monthly meetings of the PWBs should be open to the public – as they were until 1983. 
Annual public meetings could be held to encourage discussion of the PWBs plans for the coming year. 
 
OFWAT would continue as a government department, but its staff should be returned to political 
accountability as part of a government department, DEFRA, and answerable once again to ministers.  The 
relationship between DEFRA and the PWBs should enable overall price and investment levels to be the 
responsibility of DEFRA, while the plans and actions and prices of each regional PWB would be determined 
by the PWB.   
10.3. Bulk water supply and water resources 
Another approach would be to create a single, national, public body responsible for managing water 
resources and all the bulk supply of water from reservoirs and aquifers: a National Water Resources 
Authority (NWRA). Such a body would naturally have strong representation of the Environment Agency, as 
well as of government, local councils, and stakeholders. It would be able to develop a long-term plan for 
managing water resources, free from commercial short-term considerations; could develop the most efficient 
systems for distribution of bulk water to match demand and so reduce water stress; and so could develop 
plans to minimise the need for further reservoirs or desalination plants.       
 
A further advantage of such a separate NWRA would be an immediate positive effect on the incentive to 
deal with leakage. The NWRA would sell bulk supplies of water to the distribution companies, and so the 
companies would have a significant financial incentive to reduce real leakage losses, because this would 
enable them to reduce their purchases of bulk water. In Paris, where the city council owns and runs the bulk 
water supply, the leakage rate was halved in 15 years as a consequence (see above, section 8.3). 
 
10.4. Costs and borrowing 
There are a number of standard objections to bringing such a large sector into public ownership. One is that 
the public sector is assumed to be less efficient. This argument is not supported by the evidence, as has 
already been discussed: public sector water operators have records on efficiency and productivity which are 
every bit as good as any private companies. 
 
Two other objections are based on cost. 
 
One argument says that it is too expensive to bring a large sector like water into public ownership: it would 
increase government borrowing, and therefore increases the long-term level of taxation to pay the interest on 
these bonds. It is also argued that expenditure on other social services, such as healthcare and education, has 
higher priority, and so taxes should not be used to finance this kind of change in ownership. (however, this 
argument cannot be absolute: if a change of ownership puts us in a better position to deal with our water 
resources, makes policies more responsive to the public, and leads to lower costs and less exploitation of 
monopolies, then public ownership financed by government bonds should be considered on both political 
and economic grounds).  
 
The second argument is that it would mean a great increase in public sector borrowing, which would conflict 
with EU and UK government rules which limit government deficits. 
 
The next two sections address these arguments. 
10.5. Public ownership and bond financing: reducing costs 
Public ownership of the industry would mean refinancing it, by replacing the present mix of private capital 
entirely with public sector bond finance. The impact of such a switch to bond financing would not increase 
the costs to the taxpayer or consumer at all – in fact it would result in a considerable reduction in costs.  
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This is because debt finance – through bonds or loans – is cheaper than the existing mixture of private 
equity, bonds and bank loans – . This has been recognised in earlier discussions of converting the companies 
into mutuals, when OFWAT estimated that the real post-tax cost of debt finance is about 1 1/2 percentage 
points cheaper than the current mixture of debt and equity. 153  And, because the water industry is capital-
intensive, the effect of using less costly finance is dramatic: in 2000, an analyst at UBS Warburg ―estimated 
that water prices could fall by a further 5 per cent if the industry financed itself more efficiently purely by 
debt‖. 154 This was confirmed from the actual savings achieved when  Welsh Water was transferred to a 
private not-for-profit company, which paid by issuing bonds. 155 It estimated that the effect of refinancing the 
operation with bonds was to cut the annual financing costs of Welsh Water by around a quarter, saving £50 
million a year.156 
 
The actual savings of bringing the companies into public ownership through bond issues can be estimated 
from the current data on the cost of equity and debt finance to the private companies. Dividends to 
shareholders represent a cost of  about 8.8% on capital; interest payments on debt represent a cost of about 
5% on capital. The total cost in 2004-05 was £2.4 billion. If all this was replaced with public sector debt at 
4%, the cost instead would be about £1.5 billion – an annual saving of £900million. If lower cost government 
debt was used, at 3% or less, the savings could be even greater: long term debt at 2.5%  
 
Public ownership of all the water companies could thus save at least £900 million every year by 
reducing the cost of capital of the water companies. This is equivalent to a reduction of about 12% off 
the average household bill for water and sewerage, about £20 per year per person in England and 
Wales, or an increase of 25% in capital investment.  
 
Annual savings on this scale would open greater possibilities of progress on a number of issues which are 
currently of great public interest. Price freezes or reductions would become a serious possibility. Capital 
investment could be increased by 25% or more. This would make possible a more serious and rapid 
programme for controlling leakage, and/or make it more feasible to finance other proposals, such as 
proposals for inter-regional transfers of water resources to drier areas such as the South East. 
Table 9 Annual savings from public ownership: reduced cost of capital 
 Private 
companies 
  Public 
ownership 
 
 2004-05     
 Equity Debt Total Debt at 4% Debt at 2.5% 
Capital  14.0 22.5 36.5 36.5 36.5 
Dividends/interest 1.2 1.1 2.4 1.5 0.9 
Cost as % 8.8 5.0 6.5 4.0 2.5 
ANNUAL SAVING FROM PUBLIC 
OWNERSHIP 
   0.9 1.5 
 
10.6. Government or PWB bonds 
The largest savings would be achieved by using long-term 50 year index-linked government bonds. These 
have the lowest real cost of all: if the estimates discussed earlier are correct, then the real cost of such bonds 
could be as low as 1%, which would represent a saving of about £2 billion per year over the current costs. 
Such long-term financing is entirely appropriate to the water industry, which has a guaranteed long-term 
future, and whose capital programmes are best planned on a long-term basis. Such financing would help 
release the industry from the commercial short-termism from which it suffers. In addition, pension funds and 
insurance companies, who are looking for long-term investments but suffering from a severe shortage of 
government bonds, could positively welcome public ownership financed by such bonds.  
 
If government remains resistant to the idea of using public borrowing, public ownership of the water industry 
could instead be financed by water bonds issued by the new PWBs themselves (or by a special water bank, 
owned by the PWBs).  The bonds could be secured not against tax revenues but against the revenues from 
water charges. This is a widespread and normal form of financing water services elsewhere in the world: 
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municipally owned companies such as Stockholm Water issue their own bonds, which are very highly rated, 
and the Netherlands water banks are also very highly rated. Public ownership would then have no 
implications for central government borrowing.  
 
A move to public ownership financed by either of these methods would probably be greatly welcomed by 
major investors. And it would not necessarily be strongly resisted by all the current private owners, many of 
whom have been attempting to sell their water companies for years. RWE, for example, might be relieved to 
sell Thames Water in exchange for secure public sector bonds. It could be positively welcomed by the 
bondholders and banks who have financed them, as their current holdings would be replaced with long-term 
public sector bonds. In terms of credit ratings, the absence of private shareholders is a positive advantage, 
according to the rating agency Standard and Poor, which has stated that: ―an ownership structure which 
excludes shareholders, is viewed as being more prudent from a credit perspective as it eliminates potential 
pressure for dividends and other shareholder returns.‖ 157   
 
10.7. EU and government borrowing limits and public ownership  
There is therefore no doubt that public ownership would result in lower costs of capital. Nevertheless, it 
would also result in an increase in the borrowing and debt carried by the public sector, and so the EU and 
UK rules on public borrowing need to be considered. 
 
The EU rules set a limit on government deficits of 3% of GDP. If the water industry was brought into public 
ownership through issuing £36 billion in bonds, this would however have no effect on the EU limits, for two 
reasons. Firstly, it is because the EU, unlike the UK, treats a purchase or sale of a trading operation as a 
simple exchange, whereby the amount spent is offset by the equal value of the assets bought – in this case the 
water industry itself. Secondly, if the debt is issued by the newly public PWBs, the EU does not count this as 
government borrowing. The EU definition of government deficit excludes the borrowing or debt of 
―commercial operations‖, even if they are wholly owned by governments or local authorities. The new 
PWBs would clearly be ―commercial entities‖ as their income is almost totally from user charges. Bringing 
the industry into public ownership would thus have no effect on the UK‘s compliance with EU rules (see 
Annex 2 for details). 158   
 
The UK government policies are based on two principles: the golden rule, that ―over the economic cycle, he 
Government will borrow only to invest and not to fund current spending‖; and the sustainable investment 
rule: ―public sector net debt as a proportion of GDP will be held over the economic cycle at a stable and 
prudent level.‖ The UK definition of public sector net borrowing (PSNB) differs from the EU definition in 
two crucial respects, both of which create artificial incentives in favour of privatisation and against public 
ownership. Firstly, it includes the borrowing of publicly owned corporations, and so even bonds issued by 
the PWBs would count as public sector borrowing in terms of UK policy. Secondly, it treats the income from 
privatising public corporations as reducing the deficit, and the cost of buying corporations as increasing the 
deficit (whereas the EU approach simply treats these payments as a change of ownership, in which the value 
of the money paid in either direction is simply swapped for assets of equal value). It is these policies and 
definitions which create an artificial incentive in favour of private ownership. 159 
 
However, even under the UK definitions, borrowing to refinance the water industry at a much lower cost 
should, on any definition, be treated as an investment – with substantial returns to the public of hundreds of 
millions of pounds per year – and should therefore be clearly compatible with the golden rule. This would be 
true whether government bonds or PWB bonds were used.  
 
Public ownership of the water industry does not affect compliance with EU rules on government 
deficits, and is fully compatible with the UK’s “golden rule”, as it would represent an excellent public 
investment, yielding a return to the public of over £900 million per year.   
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Annex 1 Further charts and tables 
Chart G. Trends in expenditure of RWAs before privatisation: operating and capital expenditure 
of water authorities 1974-1989 (2003-04 prices) 
 
Source: OFWAT 160 
Chart H. Actual and projected capital investment by water companies in England and Wales 
1981-2010 (at 2003-04 prices) 
 
Source: OFWAT 161 
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Chart I. Rates of return to water companies 1991-2004, and projected 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart J. Increase in debt of private water companies since privatisation 
 
 
Source; OFWAT/DEFRA 2006 162 
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Chart K. Components of the average household bill 1991–2004 
 
 
Source: OFWAT/DEFRA 2006. 163 
 
 
Table 10 International comparisons of water costs for industrial users, 2005 
 
Source: NUS Consulting Goup 2005164 
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Table 11 Investment shortfalls by private water companies 2000-2005
165
 
 Assumed total 
volume of 
investment activity 
2000-01 to 2004-05  
 
£ million 
Actual total volume 
of investment 
activity 2000-01 to 
2004-05 
 
£ million 
Five year difference 
from 2000-01 to 
2004-05  
 
 
£ million 
Five year difference 
as a percentage of 
total voume of 
investment activity  
% 
Water and sewerage services 
Anglian 1,511 1,334 -177 -12 
Dwr Cymru 1,322 1,194 -138 -10 
Northumbrian 1,059 1,003 -55 -5 
Severn Trent 2,268 1,914 -354 -16 
South West 902 801 -100 -11 
Southern 1,133 1,145 12 1 
Thames 2,417 2,484 67 3 
United Utilities 3,308 3,000 -308 -9 
Wessex 936 794 -142 -15 
Yorkshire 1,789 1,553 -237 -13 
Total WaSCS 16,655 15,223 -1,432 -9 
 
Water only companies 
Bournemouth and 
West Hampshire 
60 49 -11 -19 
Bristol 117 107 -10 -8 
Cambridge 16 18 2 15 
Dee Valley 31 30 -1 -5 
Folkestone 31 29 -2 -7 
Mid Kent 111 106 -5 -5 
Portsmouth 55 41 -14 -26 
South East 211 180 -31 -15 
South Staffordshire 104 103 -1 -1 
Sutton and East 
Surrey 
97 90 -7 -7 
Tendring Hundred 15 15 0 -3 
Three Valleys 261 275 -6 -2 
Total WoCs 1,129 1,042 -87 -8 
     
Industry Total 17,784 16,265 -1,519 -9 
Source: OFWAT 2005 166 
 
Chart L. USA cities compared with English and Welsh  companies 
Leakage rates, USA cities and UK companies
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Source: OFWAT , author calculations 
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Chart M. Asian cities compared with English and Welsh  companies 
 
Leakage rates, Asian cities and UK companies
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Table 12 Breakdown of leakage and non-revenue water: Colombo and Thames Water 
 Non-revenue water Of which:  
  Illegal connections, 
unpaid bills, etc 
Leakage 
City of Colombo (inner city) 53 28 25 
Greater Colombo 35 12 23 
Thames Water 33 0 33 
England and Wales average 23 0 23 
Sources:  Water in Asian Cities 167;  author’s calculations from OFWAT data; OFWAT letter to Guardian  
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Table 13 Results of BBC/Populus poll on public ownership of water June 2006 
 
 
 
Annex 2 EU rules on government borrowing and deficit 
The EU policies on government deficits, known as the Stability and Growth Pact, are summarised on the 
European Commission website at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/about/activities/sgp/sgp_en.htm .  
 
The basic rules on government deficit are set out in Article 104 of the treaty: 
Article 104  
1. Member States shall avoid excessive government deficits. 
2. The Commission shall monitor the development of the budgetary situation and of the stock of 
government debt in the Member States with a view to identifying gross errors. In particular it shall 
examine compliance with budgetary discipline on the basis of the following two criteria: 
(a) whether the ratio of the planned or actual government deficit to gross domestic product exceeds a 
reference value…; 
(b) whether the ratio of government debt to gross domestic product exceeds a reference value….. 
The reference values are specified in the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to this 
Treaty. 
http://europa.eu/eur-lex/en/treaties/selected/livre223.html#anArt6  
 
The definition of government deficit is set out in a Protocol annexed to section 104 of the treaty:  
Article 1 : The reference values referred to in Article 104(2) of this Treaty are: 
— 3% for the ratio of the planned or actual government deficit to gross domestic product at market 
prices; 
— 60% for the ratio of government debt to gross domestic product at market prices. 
Article 2  In Article 104 of this Treaty and in this Protocol: 
— government means general government, that is central government, regional or local government 
and social security funds, to the exclusion of commercial operations, as defined in the European 
System of Integrated Economic Accounts; 
— deficit means net borrowing as defined in the European System of Integrated Economic 
Accounts; 
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— investment means gross fixed capital formation as defined in the European System of Integrated 
Economic Accounts; 
— debt means total gross debt at nominal value outstanding at the end of the year and consolidated 
between and within the sectors of general government as defined in the first indent. 
; http://europa.eu/eur-lex/en/treaties/selected/livre335.html .    
 
The definition of ‗commercial operations‘ is set out in Council Regulation (EC) No 475/2000 of 28 February 
2000 amending Regulation (EC) No 3605/93 on the application of the Protocol on the excessive deficit 
procedure annexed to the Treaty establishing the European Community 
 
―2. 'Government' means the sector of 'general government' (S.13), that is 'central government' 
(S.1311), 'state government' (S.1312), 'local government' (S.1313) and 'social security funds' 
(S.1314), to the exclusion of commercial operations, as defined in ESA 95.  
The exclusion of commercial operations means that the sector of 'general government' (S.13) 
comprises only institutional units producing non-market services as their main activity.  
(COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 475/2000 of 28 February 2000 
http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=EN&numdoc
=32000R0475&model=guichett  
 
The European System of Accounts (ECA95)  
http://forum.europa.eu.int/irc/dsis/nfaccount/info/data/esa95/en/titelen.htm include the definitions behind this 
concept. 
  ―General government (S.13)  
2.68 . Definition: The sector general government (S.13) includes all institutional units which are 
other non-market producers (see paragraph 3.26.) whose output is intended for individual and 
collective consumption, and mainly financed by compulsory payments made by units belonging to 
other sectors, and/or all institutional units principally engaged in the redistribution of national 
income and wealth.  
2.69 . The institutional units included in sector S.13 are the following:  
a) general government entities (excluding public producers organised as public corporations or, by 
virtue of special legislation, recognised as independent legal entities, or quasi-corporations, when 
any of these are classified in the non-financial or financial sectors) which administer and finance a 
group of activities, principally providing non-market goods and services, intended for the benefit of 
the community 
http://forum.europa.eu.int/irc/dsis/nfaccount/info/data/esa95/en/een00080.htm  
……..3.26 . Definition: Other non-market producers are local KAUs or institutional units whose 
major part of output is provided free or at not economically significant prices.  
http://forum.europa.eu.int/irc/dsis/nfaccount/info/data/esa95/en/een00125.htm#0003fac1  
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